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RUBICON FOR THE 1990s 
The story of How the united states 
went to War In the Gulf 
The date was January 10, 49 B.C. The Rubicon was a river 
that divided part of Roman Italy from the province of Cisalpine 
Gaul. Julius Caesar was commanding troops in Gaul and had gained 
much influence with the people of Gaul and Rome. Gnaeus Pompey 
and the Roman Senate began to fear Caesar's power, so they 
ordered him to give up his command. Caesar refused, and instead 
led his troops across the Rubicon River and into Roman Italy. 
This was a forbidden action, and it resulted in a civil war that 
Caesar won to take control of the Roman Empire. The Rubicon has 
come to mean a dividing line, or the moment of truth in an 
important matter, especially war. To "cross the Rubicon" means 
to make a decision that cannot be changed. 1 
On January 16, 1991, President George Bush ordered united 
states military forces to lead a united Nations coalition to war 
against Iraq. Exactly five and one-half months before, Saddam 
Hussein had led Iraqi forces into neighboring Kuwait. Saddam 
claimed Kuwait rightfully belonged to Iraq. George Bush ordered 
u. S. troops to the region and demanded that Iraq withdraw at 
once. "Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. That's not a 
threat, or a boast, that's just the way it's going to be," said 
the President. 2 Bush left no room for positioning in his 
statement. It could only be interpreted one way: the United 
states was preparing to do much more than simply condemn this 
action by Iraq. George Bush was backing his rhetoric with a 
-willingness to go to war. Conservative columnist Patrick 
Buchanan wrote, "The Presidency of George Bush is on the line. 
He has crossed the Rubicon. There is no turning back. ,,3 
Even if there was no "room" for turning back, there was 
certainly time. From August 2, 1990, to January 16, 1991, the 
united states of America struggled with the notion of going to 
war. The United states did not have a reputation for eagerly 
entering conflict. During World War One, it took the loss of the 
Lusitania and 128 American lives to convince the u.s. to go to 
war. In World War Two, the bombing of Pearl Harbor finally 
convinced Americans this was their fight. At Vietnam, the Tonkin 
Gulf incident gave President Lyndon Johnson the mandate to 
escalate the war. 4 President Bush had no evidence of a similar 
direct attack upon American territory or citizens. 
In addition, a November united Nations mandate called for 
Iraq to be out of Kuwait by January 15, 1991, or face the use of 
force. This placed the united states and President Bush in an 
unusual position. America, as the leader of the U.N. coalition 
in the gulf, had received a diplomatic IIgreen light for war" from 
the world community. Yet the united states had well over a month 
to think about the prospects of conflict. Lance Morrow wrote, 
"Rarely before has a nation had such leisure for premeditation of 
war--or for premonition of its consequences." 5 
This essay will focus on the "premeditation of war," that 
is, how the President, opinion leaders, and citizens of the 
united states reacted to and shaped events in the Persian Gulf 
between August of 1990 and January of 1991. First, the 
-.-
President's role in creating the defensive alliance will be 
examined. Second, the effect of sanctions and the role of the 
united Nations will be considered. I Third, this essay will 
identify the shift in u. s. policy from a defensive force to an 
offensive one, and the opposition this change met. Finally, the 
role of the soviet union and the final pre-war positioning of 
Iraq will be discussed. 
I 
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi tanks 'and troops poured into the 
neighboring country of Kuwait. Within hours, all notable 
resistance had ceased. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein claimed 
that Kuwait was actually Iraq's 19th province, and that Kuwaiti 
oil rightfully belonged to Iraq. President Bush responded 
swiftly to the invasion, stating, "This will not stand, this 
aggression against Kuwait.,,6 On August 7, the President ordered 
u.S. aircraft, ships, and troops to the region. The 82nd 
Airborne was among the first units to arrive, along with Navy 
SEALS and the Army's Delta Force. The initial goal of the U.S. 
was to have 125,000 troops in the region. 7 
President Bush announced four goals of u.S. policy during an 
August 8 nationally televised speech: withdrawal of Iraq from 
Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, 
stabilization of the gulf area, and protection of Americans in 
the Middle East. 8 The President also reassured American people 
that "the mission of our troops is wholly defensive. ,,9 Saddam 
Hussein responded on August 9 by officially annexing Kuwait and 
closing the Iraqi borders. 
Facing a shortage of soldiers, Bush began activating 
--
reservists for duty at home and in the gulf. According to 
Newsweek, "The Pentagon began what was clearly the biggest U. S. 
mobilization since the vietnam War.,,10 President Bush 
"nationalized" hundreds of civilian aircraft to aid in the mass 
transport to the Middle East. The strategy seemed to be working. 
Further Iraqi aggression no longer appeared likely.11 There was 
little dissent against u.s. policy at this point. In fact, a 
poll taken on August 8-9 indicated 77% of Americans supported the 
way the President had handled the situation. 12 
President Bush acted quickly to secure support from allies. 
within a week of the invasion he had made 35 phone calls to 
leaders of foreign countries. The results were impressive: 
Bush lined up the U.N. Security Council, Japan, the USSR, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Europe, and the Arab League to join the coalition 
against Saddam Hussein .13 Saudi Arabia's King Fahd agreed to 
allow U. s. forces to fortify his country. In return for his 
cooperation, Fahd got U.S. assurances that he would not be 
abondoned suddenly, but that American forces would leave if he 
asked. 14 Several Arab nations condemned Saddam Hussein for the 
invasion. 
Another show of support for the U.S. was the monetary aid 
promised by several countries. Japan and Germany donated 
billions to the Middle East cause. 15 Saudi Arabia and the exiled 
government of Kuwait pledged even more money. 
It was especially important for Washington and Moscow to 
show a unified front, so that Saddam Hussein couldn't use Cold 
War politics to his advantage. To that end, U.S. Secretary of 
--
state James Baker met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze on August 3. Together, they issued a statement 
condemning Iraq for its invasion. 16 In September, during a 
hastily-arranged summit, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev declared 
that they were "united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must 
not be tolerated. ,,17 
The Middle East crisis also initiated some strange 
alliances. On September 14, the u.S. agreed to work with Syria 
to stop Saddam, despite Syrian President Assad's involvement with 
the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. 18 This 
represented a major change in u.S. policy. Yet there was little 
outcry by the American public. 
Saddam Hussein also tried to shore up his alliances. First, 
he "sued for peace" with Iran, whom he had been warring with 
throughout the 1980s. Saddam gave up all the land he had taken 
from Iran during their war. In return, he was able to secure his 
eastern border and transfer thousands of troops south to the 
Kuwait area. Saddam also encouraged his fellow Arabs to join a 
Holy War against America. 19 President Bush insisted this tactic 
wouldn't work, but the Arab world was not completely unified 
against Saddam Hussein. Said one senior official of an Arab 
organization, "Even if Saddam was wrong, we can't allow the 
Uni ted States to simply come and destroy a fellow brother Arab 
state. ,,20 
As he pulled together this international alliance, President 
Bush also began to pull together the American people. Bush knew 
he needed to have a good rationale for sending u.s. troops into 
--
harm's way. Something noble had to be at stake. As Strobe 
Talbott put it, "Every time the U. S. has fought a maj or war in 
this century, its goals have included the defense of a principle 
larger than our own self-interest. ,,21 President Bush made the 
case for principle during his August 8 address to the nation: 
I ask your support in a decision I've made to stand up 
for what's right and condemn what's wrong--all in the 
cause of peace. . It is the world's problem . 
standing up for our principle is an American 
tradition. 22 
President Bush grew up with the World War Two generation. He 
believed very strongly that the United states had a moral 
obligation to take the lead in international affairs. 23 
Another argument in favor of war advanced by the Bush 
Administration was that Saddam had to be stopped, and if the 
world waited, the struggle would be worse later. This argument 
was also advanced by many commentators and journalists. William 
Rusher of the National Review wrote, "The goal of the realists is 
to rid the world of a proven war-starter before he takes more 
hostages next week and before he gets nuclear missles in four 
years.,,24 Newsweek said simply, "Awful as war can be, failing to 
fight it can be worse, especially if if means fighting a bigger 
and nastier war later on.,,25 
The President himself chose to go even further: Bush 
likened the gulf situation to that of Europe during the 1930s. 
"The President has compared Saddam to Hi tIer, who is 
identified in the public mind as a ruler so vicious that the only 
-solution is to destroy him," wrote George Church. 26 George Bush 
played to this theme during his August 8 address: "Iraqi tanks 
stormed in blitzkrieg fashion through Kuwait in a few short hours 
. As was the case in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an 
aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors.,,27 
A third argument pressed by those who called for war was the 
need to protect the security of the world economy and oil supply. 
This was not a new argument: in 1980 Jimmy Carter had named the 
oil supply of the West to be a matter of national security. 28 
Saddam Hussein gave this matter renewed importance. Saudi Arabia 
had 19% of the world's proven oil reserves. 29 With the oil he 
already had in Iraq and Kuwait, Saddam could control a commanding 
share of the world's oil if he could take Saudi Arabia. 
President Bush said, "Our country now imports nearly half the oil 
it consumes and could face a major threat to its economic 
independence. ,,30 Time writer George Church was even blunter: 
"What is at stake is the power to shut off heat in millions of 
homes, freezing the old and frail; to close down factories and 
util i ty plants, causing mass unemployment ,,31 The Bush 
Administration also underscored the importance of jobs in the 
gulf situation. President Bush said that Saddam' s aggression 
threatened "our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the 
freedom of friendly countries.,,32 Secretary of State Baker put 
it this way: "If you want to sum it up in one word, it's 
jobs.,,33 
Another rationale for war given by the Bush team and others 
was Saddam Hussein's use of chemical weapons on his own people 
---
(the Kurds), and his potential to someday have nuclear weapons. 
Saddam was known to have mustard gas (which attacks the lungs), 
sarin gas (which attacks the nerves and kills instantly), and 
tabun gas (a weaker form of sarin gas).34 Particularly 
troublesome for the u.s. military was the desert climate. The 
troops had been issued chemical suits, but most experts claimed 
the suits couldn't be worn for more than an hour in the desert 
heat. 35 Shortly after the August 2 invasion of Kuwait, official 
u.S. government estimates confirmed that Iraq was still five to 
ten years away from having access to nuclear weapons. 36 still, 
those supporting war action by the u.s. used the nuclear threat 
in addition to other arguments. wrote George Church, II [Saddam] 
will use chemical, bacterioligical and, one day, nuclear weapons. 
Millions may die. 1I37 Of all the arguments for war, the nuclear 
threat seemed to be the most effective in generating public 
support. 38 
One of the most impressive campaigns by George Bush was his 
effort to gain international backing for the coalition to stop 
Saddam Hussein. The focal point of this effort was the united 
Nations. The U.N. had two fixtures in place that greatly helped 
the Bush coalition. Article 51 of the U.N charter allows force 
to be used in self defense of an attack by the nation being 
attacked and nations coming to its aid. Article 42 of the 
charter empowers the Security Council to take measures to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.39 The U.N. 
also passed two crucial resolutions which made the allied effort 
possible. On August 25, the Security Council voted to condemn 
-Iraq and called for U.N. action. This gave Bush early support. 
Then on November 29, the security Council set January 15, 1991, 
as the deadline for Iraq to leave Kuwait. The Security Council 
authorized the U.N. forces, led by the united States, to use 
force if this deadline was not met. 40 
President Bush used sanctions early on as a weapon in his 
campaign against Saddam Hussein. 
cut off trade with Iraq. The 
On August 2, the united States 
President promptly froze $30 
million in Iraqi assets, persuaded Europe and Japan to join him 
in the embargo, and convinced the Soviet Union to cut off aid to 
Iraq.41 On August 5 President Bush began a blockade of Iraq's 
ports. One day later the U. N. imposed a world-wide trade 
embargo. 
The economic struggle soon intensified. In late August 
the U.N. approved the use of force to support the trade embargo 
against Iraq. In response to the embargo, Saddam Hussein 
threatened to destroy the oil fields of the gulf region. (He 
would later start several oil fires.) On September 25 the U.N. 
voted to cut off air traffic to and from Iraq. 
Sanctions also provoked the first serious gulf-related 
policy disagreement within the U.S. The Bush Administration was 
growing restless waiting for sanctions to take effect. The 
President didn't feel the embargo was having the desired effect. 
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia pressed for more time for the 
sanctions: "If we have war, we are never going to know whether 
they would have worked. u42 Members of the Institute for 
International Economics felt sanctions would work, writing, 
---
"Iraq's GNP is likely to decrease by 48 percent as a result of 
the sanctions.,,43 Even within the Bush Administration, there was 
some support for sanctions. CIA chief William Webster said he 
fel t sanctions would be seriously affecting Iraq by summer of 
1991. 44 
Those who opposed relying on sanctions to beat Saddam 
claimed there were holes in the embargo. As early as september, 
Newsweek reported that China, India, and Iran were preparing to 
sell food and medicine to Iraq under a "humanitarian" purpose 
clause in the U.N. embargo resolution. 45 The Wall street Journal 
reported that smugglers were common along the Iraqi borders with 
Turkey and Iran, and that this activity was undermining the U.N. 
embargo. 46 George Bush did not seem to be showing patience with 
sanctions or Iraq. Said the President, "Sand is running through 
the glass for Iraq.,,47 
When the President felt sanctions might not get Saddam 
Hussein out of Kuwait, he began to explore other options. One of 
these options was a military attack against Iraq. George Bush 
had plenty of encouragement here. Newsweek reported in early 
September that "Bush's Arab allies believe that force will 
eventually be needed to drive Saddam out of Kuwait and end for 
good his threat to the region.,,48 Richard Perle wrote in the New 
York Times that what was needed was a "Desert Sword.,,49 
During October and November, the U. S. announced new troop 
arrivals that boosted the desert force to 400,000+. The 
President also began to speak of a possible military attack 
against Iraq. Bush said the new troop buildup would give U.S. 
.-
",.-, 
-
commanders "an adequate offensive military option should that be 
necessary. ,,50 The President also made it clear that the gulf 
coalition had a new objective beyond the liberation of Kuwait: 
Iraq's warfare capabilities had to be destroyed. "The status-quo 
ante will not be enough," said the President. 51 
This announced switch from a defensive force to an offensive 
one triggered a wave of dissent from many Americans. Nancy Gibbs 
wrote, "Bush's switch from a defensive to an offensive 
strategy has raised all sorts of questions. ,,52 There was a 
feeling in the U.S. that it was not America's job to attack Iraq 
and liberate Kuwait. Patrick Buchanan wrote: 
While the country still supports President Bush's "line 
in the sand" in Saudi Arabia, it is deeply apprehensive 
over losing thousands of U.S. troops liberating a 
Kuwait whose own army ran away without a fight. If 
they wouldn't die for their emir, why should the U.S. 
Marine corps?53 
Some were even bolder in their opposition to offensive action. 
Alex Molnar, a University of Wisconsin professor and father of a 
Marine in the gulf, wrote an open letter to President Bush in the 
New York Times: "If, as I expect, you eventually order American 
soldiers to attack Iraq then it is God who will have to forgive 
you. I will not.,,54 
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak reported that even the 
President's key foreign policy advisors, including the 
Secretaries of State and Defense, were growing skeptical of 
offensive military action. 55 The reason for this loss of support 
--
may have been that President Bush was not making the case for war 
well enough. "Bush has . . . failed so far to answer effectively 
the war critics," wrote George Church. 56 A Time poll indicated 
that only 49% of Americans felt Bush had done a good job telling 
why u.s. troops were in the Middle East (45% said he had done a 
poor job).57 
By late 1990 there was significant opposition to the idea of 
invading Kuwait to save it. otto Friedrich noted that "across 
the nation, a small but growing antiwar movement has started to 
mobilize.,,58 This group was varied in both background and reason 
for opposing the attack. veterans groups challenged Bush to 
explain the goals of an attack. 
without goals. civil rights 
involvement in which one third 
They refused to support a war 
leaders criticized military 
of the combatants would be 
minorities. Religious groups claimed that peaceful attempts at 
resolution had not been exhausted. College students did not 
protest the gulf involvement as greatly as some people had 
expected. This may have been due to the fact that the desert 
force was all volunteer. with no draft, the issue did not quite 
"hit home" with most college students. 59 By January, however, 
students were protesting on campuses and at the u.s. Capitol. 
Perhaps the most significant opposition to President Bush's 
plans for offense came from conservatives. 
"Traditionally, it has been not liberals but . 
Newsweek wrote: 
. radicans and 
isolationist Republicans who have most loudly opposed military 
involvement . The gulf . is reverting to this historical 
pattern. ,,60 Most liberals were decidedly quiet during the Fall 
--
of 1990, and conservatives tended to dominate the opinion pages 
because they were arguing opposite sides of the issue. 61 Most 
conservatives stood squarely with the President, including 
William Safire, Henry Kissenger, R. Emmett Tyrell, Alan Keyes, 
Mona Charen, and Thomas Sowell. National Review lent early 
support to President Bush. 62 The Wall Street Journal wrote, "The 
goal of the u.S. and its supporting forces in the Persian Gulf 
should be . . to win.,,63 still, the conservative "doves" were 
more vocal than most other war opponents, and they made the 
clearest case against war that could be found in the opinion 
pages of the u.s. media. For that reason conservative opposition 
to the war deserves special mention. 
Conservatives who opposed attacking Iraqi forces included 
Robert Novak, Patrick Buchanan, Jeane Kirkpatrick, wick Allison, 
and Tom Bethel. The libertarian Cato Institute also stood 
against war. 64 These conservatives refuted Bush's claim that 
principle demanded America take a stand against Saddam Hussein. 
Patrick Buchanan conceded that Iraq's annexation of Kuwait was 
brutal but replied, "So was Indonesia's rape of east Timor, 
China's move into Tibet, Moscow's lunge into Afghanistan.,,65 In 
none of those three previous cases did the u.s. seriously 
consider using military force of its own to right matters. 
Conservative doves also questioned the "oil" argument, 
claiming that the U.S. was not dependent upon the middle east to 
maintain its energy level. Saddam Hussein would not be able to 
control the price of oil, they said, any more than OPEC during 
its price-setting attempts. 66 Newsweek lent support to this 
--
position: "The soviet Union is the world's largest oil producer, 
and Kremlin officials think their oil could help make up for the 
loss of crude from Iraq and Kuwai t--if the u. s. provides the 
technology and investment needed.,,67 Even hawkish National 
Review admitted, "The united states is comparatively well 
positioned to do without Middle Eastern oil altogether if it has 
to.,,6B 
The conservative war opponents also argued that, with no 
vital u.s. interest at stake, and no treaty commitment to Kuwait, 
America should mind its own business, instead of playing the role 
of global police officer. 69 wick Allison argued that the 
President's plans sounded too much like Wilsonian intervention. 70 
other conservative doves claimed the u.s. was choosing to be an 
empire rather than the republic its founders envisioned. 
Saddam Hussein's nuclear and chemical threat was dismissed 
as well. Antiwar conservatives pointed out the the u.s. 
government. had estimated it would be 5-10 years before Saddam had 
nuclear capability. On the issue of chemical and biological 
weapons, the doves pointed to remarks by Iraq's foreign minister 
that he so greatly feared u.s. retaliation that he would not use 
gas weapons until America had used nuclear weapons on Iraq.71 
Joseph Sobran summed up conservative dissatisfaction with the 
case of the Bush Administration: "The wise heads have so many 
rationales for war, pronto. One good one would do.,,72 
Congress did not get into the war debate until late in the 
Fall of 1990. On October 2, the Senate had voted to back 
deployment, but that backing did not cover war. Most 
--
Representatives and Senators were not eager to talk about the 
gulf situation until after the November elections were over. 
Patrick Buchanan wryly noted that "Democrats, with the election 
over, have rediscovered their voice boxes. 1I73 
Initially, Congress debated whether it even needed to debate 
the issue of war. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney maintained 
the President did not need permission to send troops into action 
in the desert. 74 Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell 
disagreed, and so did most of the Congress. Even those on the 
Hill who supported the President, such as Indiana's Richard 
Lugar, called for a vote to get congressional approval. George 
Bush feared such a vote, because he felt there was a chance he 
might lose. 75 The President reasoned that even a close victory 
in the Congress might be encouraging to Saddam Hussein. Debate 
opened on Capitol Hill in both houses on January 10, 1991. When 
the Congress finally voted, the result was indeed close. 
President Bush received approval for war, 250-183 in the House, 
and 52-47 in the Senate. The conservative Republicans in 
congress uniformly supported the President, who also picked up 
some Democratic votes for his margins of victory.76 
As the January 15 deadline approached, President Bush also 
met with resistance from the Soviet Union. The Soviets had 
supported Bush early in the gulf situation, but they soon began 
to relent. It was not in the best interest of the Soviets to 
have Iraq destroyed. Newsweek reported that "the Soviets have a 
vested economic and political interest in Saddam's regime, which 
owes them billions of dollars for arms purchases. "77 For this 
reason, 193 soviet military specialists remained inside Iraq 
after the August 2 invasion of Kuwait. 78 
The President also had to contend with Mikhail Gorbachev 
himself. On October 28, Gorbachev said that Iraq may be 
softening, and that force should not be used. 79 The Soviet 
President continued to hold out on backing George Bush for an 
attack in the gulf. Not until days before the January 15 
deadline did Gorbachev give Bush his personal assurance that the 
Soviets were fully behind the U.N. coalition. 
Finally, President Bush had to contend with the diplomatic 
initiatives of Saddam Hussein. Saddam had taken hostages in 
early August, but he began releasing women and children near the 
end of the month. On December 6, Saddam promised to release all 
hostages. This action hurt Bush's case for war. Lisa Beyer 
wrote, "[this] makes it harder for the Bush Administration to 
sell an offensive action to the American Congress and public.,,80 
Iraq promised "the Mother of all Battles" if Bush decided to 
fight. 81 President Bush replied, "I am more determined than ever 
to see that this invading dictator gets out of Kuwait with no 
compromise of any kind whatsoever. ,,82 
In early December President Bush announced a last chance 
for peace. Iraq's foreign minister would be welcomed to 
Washington, and Secretary of State James Baker would travel to 
Baghdad. 83 During these talks, perhaps the dispute could be 
resolved. The results were disappointing, however. The final 
negotiations between Baker and Iraq's Tariq Aziz broke down in 
early January.84 
-On January 10, 1991, a Time/CNN poll showed that 45% of the 
American people favored continuing the sanctions against Iraq. 
Another 41% said the u.s. should go to war with Saddam Hussein. 85 
However, George Bush had cleared all of the necessary hurdles for 
starting conflict. The President had the approval of the world 
community, evidenced by the U.N. votes. He also had approval 
from both houses of Congress, although the vote was very close in 
the Senate. The decision was left in the President's hands. On 
January 16, 1991, George Bush led a divided country across the 
Rubicon. 
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